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1 Introduction
The dedication of this issue of the IDS Bulletin to
social protection testifies to the topic’s increasing
importance in development discourse and policy.
Holzman et al. (2003) describe the rise of social
protection within the World Bank. They trace its rise
at least in part to the recognition that vulnerability
defines reality for many of the world’s poor.
Vulnerability in turn distorts and mis-shapes people’s
inter-temporal resource allocation behaviour – not
only for those who are currently poor, but also for
the non-poor, who are vulnerable to collapsing into
poverty. Because of these induced distortions,
vulnerability is economically costly and contributes to
the perpetuation of poverty over time.
While this description of vulnerability and its
consequences is widely accepted, exactly what
should be done about it remains a topic of some
debate and discussion, as this issue of the IDS Bulletin
illustrates. The World Bank’s own social risk
management approach seems to conceptualise risk
as something exogenous and immutable, and
therefore focuses on social protection policies that
help people more effectively to manage the prospect
of risk ex ante and deal with its aftermath ex post (see
Holzmann and Kozel, this IDS Bulletin). In contrast,
the transformative approach to social protection
articulated by Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (this
IDS Bulletin) explicitly targets vulnerability itself,
seeing it as more of a social construction – a by-
product of social exclusion – rather than a
consequence of nature that needs to be managed as
well as possible.
While both of these approaches have merit, this
brief think-piece takes a step back from this debate
and uses the economic theory of ‘asset thresholds’
and ‘poverty traps’ to reflect on the nature of risk,
vulnerability and the circumstances that make them
especially salient. We make three basic points:
1 A social protection agenda becomes especially
urgent in the face of poverty traps and asset
thresholds that can create irreversibilities when
shocks hit.
2 It is the combination of asset poverty and
exclusion that generates the poverty traps that
allow shocks to create the irreversibilities that
give social protection its particular salience. 
3 Knowledge of the nature and location of asset
thresholds is essential to effective design of
productive safety nets and social protection more
generally.
While self-consciously designed to illuminate an
approach to social protection based on asset
thresholds, this article is not intended to de-
legitimise insights from other approaches to social
protection. Indeed, as we argue at the end of this
article, the most promising approach to social
protection employs insights from the social risk
management framework, as well as from the
transformative and the asset threshold approaches.
2 ‘Something bad can happen and spell ruin’:
insights from the economic theory of poverty traps
In a recent article, Calvo and Dercon (2005) observe
that the common thread in definitions of economic
vulnerability is a ‘sense of insecurity, of potential
harm people must feel wary of – something bad can
happen and spell ruin’ (emphasis added). Note that
this conceptualisation transcends realisations of
adverse events and thus is not solely about
fluctuation in measures of material wellbeing
(e.g. income, expenditures), but more broadly
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encompasses perceptions that adverse events may
occur. This notion that a random event (e.g. a flood, a
drought, an illness or an unemployment spell) can
have permanent effects, spelling ruin for a family,
suggests that vulnerability, and perhaps social
protection against vulnerability, can be understood
through the lens of poverty traps.
Carter and Barrett (2006) summarise both macro- and
microeconomic theories of poverty traps. A common
element of poverty trap models is that they identify a
critical asset threshold around which behaviour
bifurcates. Below the threshold lie those who are
‘ruined’, who can do no better in expectation than
hang on and whose pathways out of persistent poverty
are blocked, for reasons we explain below.1 By contrast,
those above the threshold can be expected to invest
productively, accumulate and advance. The bifurcation
of behaviour at the asset threshold creates divergent
longer-term prospects and thus welfare status for
those above and below the threshold. Following
Zimmerman and Carter (2003), Carter and Barrett
label this critical threshold the ‘Micawber Threshold’.2
From a social protection perspective, the Micawber
threshold is important because it implies that
temporary shocks (e.g. livestock deaths) can have
permanent adverse consequences for those knocked
beneath the threshold.3 Other households, who do
not fall below the threshold, can be expected to
recover fully from an objectively similar shock
(Dercon 2004). The next section more fully considers
the policy implications of these ideas for social
protection, in particular for productive safety nets.
While there are multiple theoretical explanations of
the forces that create poverty traps and the
Micawber threshold, they share the common
element that trapped agents suffer exclusion from
the social and market mechanisms that mediate
access to capital and insurance. If people could freely
borrow to build up their stock of productive assets
or insure themselves against their assets falling
below the threshold, they would, and there would
be no discrete bifurcation of behaviour around a
particular threshold. The often overlooked centrality
of exclusion in poverty traps models complements
the Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux understanding
of vulnerability and social protection.
In addition to its implication that asset dynamics will
bifurcate, the existence of a poverty trap has a
second important implication. In the face of income
shocks, individuals just above a critical asset threshold
will tend to preserve or smooth their assets,
destabilising consumption in order to avoid a costly
collapse below the Micawber threshold.4 In their
poverty trap model, Zimmerman and Carter (2003)
explore this point in some detail, showing that not
only do steady states bifurcate around the threshold,
but also that individuals in the vicinity of a threshold
will respond differently to shocks (a bifurcation in risk
management behaviour). This observation suggests a
second way to test for and identify the existence of a
Micawber threshold.
3 From theory to empirical evidence
As a prelude to an explicit analysis of the implications
of asset thresholds for social protection, this section
reviews some of the recent empirical evidence on
the existence of such thresholds. One set of studies
directly explores asset dynamics, searching for
indications that asset accumulation bifurcates around
a threshold value. A second set looks at behavioural
response to shocks, again searching for an asset
threshold around which behaviour bifurcates.
The studies that have directly tested for poverty traps
have modelled household welfare dynamics either
fully parametrically or fully non-parametrically. Three
parametric studies (Jalan and Ravallion 2004; Lokshin
and Ravallion 2004; Barrett et al. 2006b) have
estimated the level of household welfare (either
income or assets) in one period through a
polynomial auto-regression. The first two of these
studies find only one dynamic equilibrium and no
poverty trap. However, the parametric estimation
methods used in these studies assume globally
decreasing returns to scale, thus assuming away one
of the key features for which one ostensibly wishes
to test, i.e. locally increasing returns that could give
rise to poverty traps. In contrast, Barrett et al.
(2006b), using a more flexible specification, find
evidence of multiple dynamic equilibria consistent
with the presence of a poverty trap.
One problem with these parametric specifications is,
if the unstable threshold lies in an area with few
observations, as theory suggests it will, it can be
difficult, at best, to fit a polynomial function through
the unstable equilibrium. Two alternative approaches
have been utilised. A set of three studies have used
non-parametric estimation (Lybbert et al. 2004;
Adato et al. 2006; Barrett et al. 2006b). All three
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find evidence of multiple equilibria and a Micawber
threshold. For example, the Adato et al. (2006) study
of South Africa finds that households with assets less
than those needed for a living standard of twice the
official poverty line tend to collapse back to a low
level standard of living equal to 90 per cent of the
poverty line.
Carter et al. (forthcoming 2007) take an alternative
approach and employ Hansen’s (1999) threshold
estimator to test directly for the existence of a
threshold around which accumulation behaviour
bifurcates. Drawing on longitudinal data collected
around two environmental shocks (a 1998 hurricane
‘Mitch’ in Honduras and a prolonged drought in
Ethiopia over the late 1990s and early 2000s), they find
evidence of a Micawber threshold around which asset
accumulation bifurcates. While their analysis is subject
to limitations,5 it does suggest that shocks that push
households below critical threshold levels can have
permanent consequences.
In addition to these initial efforts to test directly for
the existence of poverty traps borne of multiple
equilibria by estimating expected welfare dynamics,
two other studies explore the asset-smoothing
implications of asset thresholds. The study by Carter et
al. (forthcoming 2007) of drought in Ethiopia weakly
reveals a pattern of asset smoothing among the
lowest wealth households, meaning that households
at the bottom try to hold on to their few assets even
as income and consumption possibilities dwindle
during a period of severe losses in agricultural
production. Similarly, among pastoralists in northern
Kenya the variability of household expenditures
exceeds that of income below an apparent dynamic
asset poverty threshold, but not above it (Barrett et al.
2006b). The poor appear to manage their herds so as
to smooth assets, not consumption.
Finally, in perhaps the most compelling demonstration of
asset smoothing, Hoddinott (2006), using data from rural
Zimbabwe, shows that households above a threshold (of
two cattle) sell livestock so as to smooth consumption in
the face of drought-induced income losses. Below that
threshold, however, households are much less likely to
sell livestock, and instead cope with income loss via
decreased consumption, i.e. they asset smooth.
4 Asset thresholds and social protection policy
While there is still much to learn about the relevance
and location of asset thresholds, their implications
for social protection are enormous. Barrett, Carter
and Ikegmai (2006a) (BCI) use numerical analysis of a
stochastic dynamic programming model to explore
social protection in an economy characterised by
skill-conditional poverty traps, wherein a household’s
innate ability determines its Micawber threshold.
That model combines an exclusionary mechanism –
households have no access to credit or insurance –
with exogenous risk, thereby merging essential
elements of the World Bank’s social risk
management and the IDS transformative social
protection approach. In the first instance they
explore the impact of a standard humanitarian
assistance regime in which aid resources provide
minimal transfers targeted to those most in need so
as to ensure some minimum level of current
consumption. They show how over time, random
events can steadily push ever greater numbers of
people below the critical asset threshold, leading to
ever increasing numbers of poor people and a
corresponding ‘relief trap’ for development assistance
in which a fixed budget becomes increasingly
absorbed by the demands of humanitarian response.6
While their results of course depend on the specific
parameter values chosen, their analysis arguably
explains the dynamic of food aid and humanitarian
assistance discussed by Barrett and Carter (2001–2),
in which an ever larger fraction of the international
aid budget is consumed by emergency relief.
Given these simulation results, BCI then ask whether
a more effective social protection programme can be
built up using the notion of a ‘productive social safety
net’. A productive social safety net is staked out at the
Micawber threshold, as a first priority transferring
resources to households that would otherwise fall
below the threshold and be expected to collapse into
the poverty trap. Such a safety net is productive in the
sense that it maintains households’ stock of
productive assets, enabling them to pull themselves
up by their own bootstraps, viably rebuilding assets
and moving ahead over time. In BCI’s numerical
analysis, modest productive safety net transfers in the
wake of shocks generate large social returns in terms
of increased future production and a far smaller
subpopulation of persistently poor households.
While productive social safety nets can generate large
returns, would social protection built around this
concept be good policy? To analyse this question, BCI
perform a series of budget neutral simulations,
comparing the results of a standard humanitarian
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model of social protection – providing modest
transfers to the poorest first – with a triage model in
which scarce budget resources are first dedicated to
maintaining individuals above the Micawber threshold,
with only a residual budget used to address the
poverty of those already deeply in poverty below the
threshold. While their results are subject to all the
usual caveats of simulation-based findings, the triage
policy dominates the humanitarian policy after 10
years, in terms of headcount, poverty gap and second-
degree Foster–Greer–Thorbecke measures of poverty.
The productive safety net policy achieves this because
its asset threshold targeting stems the growth of a
chronically poor population that would otherwise
overwhelm the available social assistance budget.
By contrast, the humanitarian model of social
protection does better by poverty reduction
standards in early simulation periods because it more
effectively addresses near-term acute poverty. But
these near-term gains can prove unsustainable if
nothing is done to help those trapped in poverty
surmount the critical asset threshold nor to keep the
non-poor from collapsing into poverty due to
adverse asset shocks. BCI’s simulations further show
that if political will exists to support front-loading of
humanitarian and development assistance budgets on
a constant net present value of budget basis – rather
than a constant real annual budget basis – one can
enjoy the best of both of these models, reducing
acute poverty today while preventing collapse into
that condition in the future.
In summary, while there is still much to learn about
their policy relevance and how to identify them
empirically, asset thresholds are a powerful concept
and piece of information for the design of more
effective social protection. The discussion in this
section has focused solely on using asset threshold
information to design more effective social protection,
taking as given the economic structure that generates
these thresholds. However, as should be clear from
the earlier discussion, poverty traps and asset
thresholds result from the conspiracy of exogenous
shocks and social exclusion. Policies that address the
former (e.g. index insurance that fundamentally alters
the economic impact of given environmental events)
or the latter (e.g. the innovation of new institutions
and organisations that improve access to financial
services), can also lead to improved social protection.
While the latter may seem more consistent with the
transformative approach of Sabates-Wheeler and
Devereux, and the former more consistent with the
World Bank’s social risk management approach, the
enormity of the problem of risk and social protection
calls upon us all to draw creatively on these two
approaches as well as on the asset threshold analysis
that this article has privileged.
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Notes
1 Note that ‘ruin’ need not be deterministic in these
models. With good luck, some seemingly trapped
poor people can surmount the asset threshold.
This possibility can further distort behaviour, in
particular inducing a sort of moral hazard as those
who are, in expectation, trapped in poverty,
actively seek out risky activities, gambling that a
lucky draw might deliver them from a ruinous fate
(Lybbert and Barrett, forthcoming).
2 Zimmerman and Carter in turn pinched the term
from Lipton (1993) who uses the term somewhat
differently to evoke a level poverty below which
virtuous Victorian savings strategies cannot be
implemented. Lipton labelled this level ‘Micawber’
in honour of the Charles Dickens character Wilkens
Micawber, who told David Copperfield: ‘Annual
income twenty pounds, annual expenditure
nineteen nineteen and six, result happiness. Annual
income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty
pounds nought and six, result misery’.
3 The threshold also has asset-building (‘cargo net’)
implications that we do not discuss here. See
Carter and Barrett (2006) for more detail.
4 Beyond Zimmerman and Carter, theoretical
analysis of asset smoothing is thin. Deaton (1992),
for example, mentions that such an asset
preservation strategy can occur when shocks are
known to be auto-correlated. Numerous
observers have commented on this phenomenon
and its costliness (e.g. Drèze and Sen 1989).
McPeak (2004) models how positive correlation
between asset and income shocks will lead to a
form of asset smoothing that limits the use of
assets to stabilise current consumption and finds
evidence of this behaviour in data on northern
Kenyan pastoralists.
5 Similar to the macroeconomic analysis of Hansen
and others, the Carter et al. (forthcoming 2007)
study fails to control for individual heterogeneity
and imposes the assumption that the critical
Micawber threshold is the same for all units. Future
work needs to allow the threshold to vary by
households, in a fashion consistent with the recent
theoretical modelling of Barrett et al. (2006b).
6 Santos and Barrett (2006) similarly show how in
the presence of a critical herd size threshold
among southern Ethiopian pastoralists,
conventional post-drought herd restocking
projects targeted to the poorest ultimately prove
ineffective, because small transfers of one or two
cows become overwhelmed ultimately by the
underlying asset dynamics of the pastoral system,
in which small herds tend eventually to collapse.
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